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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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REFORMING THE INTERAGENCY AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

by

Peter Halvorsen

LT   USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

14 February 2005

ABSTRACT

The informal and ad hoc construct of the interagency process at the operational, specifically regional, level of command is insufficient to meet the changed security environment of the post-Soviet world. Attempts to formalize the process through creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the Regional Commands are likewise inadequate. In order to ensure unity of effort across all levels of command, the United States Government must create unified interagency staffs at each of the regional commands to augment or replace the present military-centric Combatant Commands, mandate mechanisms to ensure adequate staffing and resources are directed to the regional staffs, align interagency operating areas, and utilize existing interagency planning documents across the interagency process.

Reforming the Interagency at the Operational Level

Successful management of complex contingencies and crises in the modern security environment requires a coherent and rational approach combining all aspects of national power. Specifically, leaders must integrate the four instruments of power — diplomacy, information, military force, and economics (DIME) — such that each instrument is mutually supported. But integration on all levels of warfare has proved problematic. The present interagency process both in Washington and at the operational level is largely ad hoc, instituted in personal relationships and individual expertise rather than through formal processes and doctrine. The informal practice of interagency operations occurs in spite of previous experience in crisis management that resulted in development of codified interagency planning documents, which since their issuance, have been inconsistently applied and generally ignored.

While the practical informality of the interagency process has admittedly produced a certain flexibility of response at the strategic level, this marginal benefit is far outweighed by the costs levied against efficient planning and integration of interagency operations at the operational, specifically regional, level. To reduce the impacts of these costs — particularly in light of increased demands for effective interagency coordination since September 11 — the military has attempted to create effective interagency bodies at each of the Combatant Commands. These Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) have sought to create an interagency forum to advise the Combatant Commander and work around the problems of interagency coordination. The JIACGs were created in addition to three pre-existing Coast Guard led Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) developed in the 1990s to coordinate ongoing US counter-narcotic

operations. Both entities seem to be a step in the direction of a more formalized

interagency process, and the JIACG concept has been endorsed as the way forward in the

interagency. Yet the purview of the JIACG is too narrow; it lacks the necessary

resources and directive authority to plan and implement interagency efforts at the

operational level. This weakness is a repetition of the basic characteristic deficiency of

the ad hoc interagency process.

Reform of the interagency process at the operational level is a difficult prospect

for many entities within the National Security Structure to either endorse or accept.

Reform requires breaking the monopoly of decision-making held at the strategic level and

a vertical redistribution of both power and planning authority. Yet reform is imperative.

Crises in the past decade in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan, and

Iraq have shown the regional focus of interagency operations and the inadequacy of the

current construct in meeting them. Only by restructuring the formal interagency process,

therefore, will the United States improve unity of effort between all forms of national

power at the operational level. In particular, the United States Government must: (1)

create unified interagency staffs at the regional level encompassing all departments and

agencies within the National Security Structure to either augment or replace the military-

centric Combatant Commands, (2) create codified mechanisms to ensure adequate

staffing of the new regional organizations, (3) implement existing interagency planning

documents, and (4) align geographic operating areas across all executive agencies.

Methodology

This paper shall examine the development of interagency operations in the past

decade and Presidential Directives issued to govern the interagency process. The present

response to the interagency, the JIACG, will then be evaluated along with the reform proposals of the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Based upon the analysis, suggested reforms and the conditions necessary for implementation will be proposed and counterarguments addressed. It is understood that budgetary concerns would play a conspicuous role in any structural reform of the interagency process but this paper will not address the issue. Likewise, this paper focuses on interagency operations at the Regional Combatant Command level. Global Combatant Commands and the domestic interagency process will not be addressed.

Analysis

The changed nature of the global security environment since the end of the Cold War has highlighted the inadequacy of the interagency process. Different tools were required to meet the security challenges posed by a communist foe than those required in post-Soviet era crisis management. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has intervened militarily in a number of varied and increasingly complex situations. Intervention was pursued in conjunction with the provision of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, counter-drug operations, and other missions involving a number of non-military departments and agencies. Coordination between the various bodies responding to crises was often poor. In the Bosnian intervention of 1995-96, for example, the State Department was given "lead agency" status and directed to oversea implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in conjunction with both the military and a United Nations/European Union monitoring commission. Each party approached the intervention with slightly different goals, very different means, and different visions of the desired end-state. But no command authority or decision-making ability resided

within the State Department. As a result, there was no unity of effort in pursuit of a common end-state. Complicating matters, both strategic and operational direction was confused. Coordination problems were often met by simply expanding the number of officers working on the problem, rather then attempting to create a managed solution.[1]

Continuing interagency problems during the Kosovo intervention led President Clinton in May 1997 to issue Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56). PDD-56 formalized the interagency planning process and mandated an integrated pol-mil strategic plan, interagency rehearsals, and an integrated response at both the strategic and operational level. Although never fully implemented, PDD-56 set a benchmark for interagency coordination.[2] Upon assuming office, the Bush Administration created its own system for interagency coordination, effectively abolishing the lessons learned from the Clinton White House. This is not a new phenomenon; one of the simultaneous dangers and advantages of representative democracy is the periodic change of government, which must learn anew lessons understood by its predecessor. Structures not set in law and without the corporate surety of being "the way it has always been done", such as PDD-56, will go by the wayside.

No equivalent Bush Administration directive exists to PDD-56. National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), outlining operations of the National Security Council, is not explicit in how interagency operations are to be planned or implemented.[3] According to critics, the failure of NSPD-1 to specify planning is an outgrowth of an Administration belief that it is impossible to plan for a crisis.[4] In effect, the lack of an interagency response plan returned interagency operations at both the strategic and operational level to the realm of ad hoc interpersonal relationships.

Some outgrowths from PDD-56 did live on into the current interagency process. Annex V of the military's JOPES planning process, for instance, requires military planners to examine the non-military implications of an operation. But Annex V is a post-script to the planning process, provided to interagency staffers after the military has completed its operational plan as more of an information point than a request for substantive input. In addition to Annex V, the National Defense University in July 2002 revised their generic Pol-Mil template for multilateral contingency planning.[5] The template is an extensive planning document, first issued in 1995, that mandates definition of the objective in any contingency operation, statement of the desired end-state, and includes identifying what military, diplomatic, and fiscal requirements the operation will require. Lead agencies are identified for generation of specific parts of the plan, and the document calls for establishment of a recognized command and control framework. The template looks much like the military's Commanders Estimate of the Situation process, refined to broaden the scope of planning and level of involvement to all aspects of national power. The template has not, however, been used in addressing contingency operations and remains largely ignored.

The failure of interagency planning operations has nowhere been more evident than in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both operations, the Department of Defense was given lead agency status, which ensured unity of command, but arguably destroyed unity of effort across the interagency.[6] In Afghanistan, the interagency effort was hampered by the reluctance of many agencies and involved non-governmental organizations to co-locate with the military, creating both communications and security problems and contributing to poor organizational responses to unfolding events.

Representatives of the interagency complained that after time, they were both marginalized by the military and denied access to high-ranking military commanders.[7]

The Iraq War example is more disturbing. In the prelude to war, personalities within the Defense Department dismissed several notions of how the United States would be received and scrubbed the reports of the State Department led, interagency-staffed Future of Iraq project.[8] Commentators on the post-invasion period have linked the lack of a reconstruction plan in advance of the invasion to many of the problems the United States continues to face in Iraq.[9] The interagency process at the operational level in Iraq was further harmed by the establishment of parallel military and civilian command structures set up to govern the nation. The two entities coexisted, but neither the military nor the Coalition Provisional Authority could be assured of directing reconstruction efforts. In Iraq, the operational level interagency process under the CPA proved no better than interagency operations in Bosnia. No unity of effort existed and at times, it seemed the military and CPA worked at cross-purposes.[10]

One possible response to the problems of interagency coordination at the operational level is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group. First developed by Joint Forces Command in early 2001, the first operational JIACG was established at PACOM by Admiral Dennis Blair in early 2002 with a specific mandate to provide advice and coordination on counter-terror issues.[11] JIACG-CTs (counter-terror) quickly followed at each of the Regional Combatant Commands and were in turn followed by "full-spectrum" JIACGs at the Global Combatant Commands in 2004. Notionally, the Regional Command JIACG staff is limited to 10-12 personnel. A senior State or Defense civilian serves as Chief, with senior uniformed officers serving as both Deputy and

Operations Officer. Additional personnel include State Department regional experts, a

USAID representative, representatives from the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and

Homeland Security, and 2-3 representatives from CIA, FBI, DEA, or NSA.[12]

Proponents of the JIACG concept, specifically JFCOM, have consistently called

the groups an unmitigated success and a solution to the interagency process at the

Combatant Commands. JFCOM defines the JIACG as a "multi-functional, advisory

element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information

sharing across the interagency community."[13] JFCOM expects to expand the JIACG

concept over 2005 and 2006 and make it the officially sanctioned CJCS method of

conducting the interagency process.[14] There is some truth to both the ease in facilitation

of information sharing and the assertion that the JIACGs have been successful thus far.

Information flow has certainly been improved; placing several people from different

agencies and departments in close-proximity ensures some amount of interaction. The

PACOM JIACG in particular has had some notable successes in the war on terror,

specifically with a number of high profile arrests in Singapore and Malaysia and a role in

coordinating the counter-terror campaign in the Philippines (OEF-P).[15] Yet a number of

criticisms must be levied against the way in which the JIACGs operate.

The regional JIACGs deal exclusively with the war on terror. Thus, the success

that they have had in this area cannot be transferred to an expectation of success in

others. The war on terror is the most important issue confronting the National Security

Apparatus and has been the prime mover in one of the two wars of the last three years

(Afghanistan) and a significant player in the other (Iraq). Fighting against terror is a

significant enabler for both general coordination and subordination of interagency

disputes arising from varied agency institutional cultures and the allocation of scarce resources. But to expect the full-spectrum JIACG concept to achieve the same level of coordination and success as the narrowly-focused counter-terrorism JIACG is optimistic. Given an expansion of responsibility, the agencies represented on the JIACG will lose the singularity of purpose and unity of effort they now possess and could very well devolve into representatives of institutional perspectives guarding parochial interests. Some evidence exists that this has already occurred. A study of STRATCOM planning noted that the full-spectrum JIACG at the command lacked the bureaucratic clout needed to really effect cooperation on numerous issues and that it was necessary to bypass the JIACG in the interest of effective policy implementation.[16]

Most importantly, the operational JIACG lacks directive authority, and has no surety of receiving adequate resources. The JIACG is dependent upon its parent Combatant Command and contributing agencies for both personnel augmentation and funding. These sums vary greatly between contributing agencies, illustrating varied levels of commitment.[17] The success of the JIACG is dependent upon the quality of personnel it attracts, a measure further dependent upon whether the assignment is seen as beneficial to an individual's career. It must also be remembered that the personnel of a JIACG are representatives *to* the group *from* their parent agency. Institutional loyalty to the parent organization conflicts with loyalty developed to the JIACG through close coordination with other members. In effect, the representatives on the JIACG are liaison officers, existing on the staff to inform the Combatant Commander and the other agencies what actions their own organization is undertaking. The members have no authority to promise an agency response to a certain issue and as a body, the JIACG has no authority

to direct action. Any plan the JIACG develops must meet with every actor's approval, increasing the time-horizon necessary for implementation. At PACOM, for the JIACG to function, the ad hoc relationships previously developed at the strategic level in Washington still mattered.[18]

Personnel concerns extend beyond who is assigned. Numbers matter. One problem noted at the PACOM JIACG was the inability of the other executive agencies to staff the JIACG to necessary levels, meaning the JIACG was at times at risk of being hijacked by the military. Finally, the JIACG is not so much led as it is refereed, for the very reasons outlined above. Only the military members of the JIACG report to the Combatant Commander. The COCOM is therefore left with a significant resource located within his AOR that he can only loosely direct dependent upon the strength of his own will and the personalities of the personnel assigned.

Yet the JIACG concept, even in its shortfalls, should be viewed as an intermediate step towards complete integration of the interagency. As stated, simply getting the various executive agencies to talk at the operational level is light years ahead of where the process was fifteen years ago. That interagency coordination works at all given the obstacles in its path is a testament to "good folks working together without any official sanction or authority, work[ing] through the problems that are evident in not having a particular process that allows you to have coordination."[19] Several proposals both in and out of government for interagency reform that go beyond the JIACG have been offered. Examining their strengths will help lead to improved recommendations and solutions. Most notable of the reform proposals are the Hart-Rudman Commission Report issued in 2001 and the CSIS *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* report of March 2004.

The Hart-Rudman Commission was formed in 1999 in order to evaluate the National Security Structure in the context of the expected security environment of the early 21st Century. Issuing their Phase I report in September 1999, the Commission offered a prescient look at the impending security environment, among other things predicting a large-scale terrorist attack on the United States. [20] To meet future threats against the United States, the Commission in 2001 offered recommendations for reform of the National Security System. Their analysis of the State Department is germane to operational level reform of the interagency process.

Calling the State Department a broken institution, the Commission called for a complete restructuring of the Department away from a dual-purpose organizational structure which allows functional and regional bureaus to co-exist at the Under-Secretary level. The structure in place has made it impossible for the President or National Security Council to receive a coherent "State-perspective" on any issue; a given regional crisis could be met by up to four different bureaus, all with different mandates and all with independent reporting chains that meet only at the Deputy Secretary level.[21]

In this environment, a coherent response from the State Department has become impossible. Its institutional culture favors bilateral relationships over regional approaches to diplomacy and impedes successful management of the complex cross-national nature of modern crises. More worryingly, because of the Department's weakness, the Hart-Rudman Commission identified a trend within the National Security Council Staff towards becoming a State Department-in-being. The current NSC is guilty of offering policy advice rather than policy coordination, making it functionally ineffective as an honest-broker and in management of interagency operations.[22]

In order to reverse the trend and return the State Department to pre-eminence as the leader of US diplomacy, the Commission recommended reorganizing the divisions within the Department along regional lines. The regional organization would allow any issue to be met with a coherent response integrating different perspectives at a lower level, with the regional Under-Secretary able to give a consolidated response plan to the Secretary. Global issues such as oceans policy and counter-terrorism would be coordinated by a revamped Bureau of Global Affairs tied into the regional bureaus.[23] Additionally, the Commission noted the dearth of operational planners within the State Department structure and called for a new office of strategic planning.[24]

The Hart-Rudman Commission's suggested reforms of the State Department highlight one of the main thrusts of interagency reform at the operational level. There is no analogous construct to the military Combatant Commanders within the State Department. Ambassadors are bilateral representatives to foreign governments and are only loosely coordinated by the regional bureaus within Political Affairs. In effect there is no regional State Department policy program and as a result, no "systematic civilian foreign policy input into military planning".[25] In truth, there is little State Department or other executive agency planning outside the military and USAID, period.

In March 2004, another significant report, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, was issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. They cited one of the major failings of the Defense Department reorganization under Goldwater-Nichols to be the interagency process, calling the failure a result of the predictability of the Soviet threat. The reorganization of the military did not, in fact could not, reliably predict the varied ways in which the military would be used in the security environment of a post-Soviet world. In

effect, the weakness of the other entities within the executive branch forced the military to play a prominent role out of all proportion to its mandate and training, leading to insufficient planning for reconstruction operations.[26]

To correct the deficiency, *BGN* recommended creation of a Deputy for Stability and Reconstruction on the NSC staff with a specific mandate to run the interagency process. They also recommended new planning cells within State, Treasury and Justice and a formal professional education process similar to that at the military War Colleges. Most importantly, the report recommended that interagency operations be *directed* by a single person appointed by the President in a lead-agency construct. The origin of the director would be immaterial, but he or she must be granted operational control over all assets assigned to the operation.[27]

A new Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established at the State Department in August 2004, could mitigate this lack of directive authority for reconstruction operations as well as planning shortfalls within the State Department. The Office seeks to "enhance the nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failed, failing, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies."[28] Headed by an Ambassadorial-rank Foreign Service Officer, the Office includes cross-departmental representation from Defense, CIA, Treasury, OFDA, and USAID. Whether the Office will be an additional layer of bureaucracy or a successful venture in support of formalization of interagency operations remains to be seen.

Direct operational control of all US government actors in a crisis, as imagined by the CSIS report, would greatly increase the unity of effort of the interagency response. Indeed, granting directive authority to a single commander would be a sea-change in the

interagency process. The lowest level at which interagency planning coordination now occurs is within the Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) of the National Security Council. This is at the Under-Secretary level and the meetings occur in Washington, with representatives who are often unfamiliar with facts on the ground. Understandably, the Washington perspective often varies widely from that espoused by officers in the field. Directive and fiscal authority is held one level higher, within the Deputies Committee.

Recommendations and Solutions

In order to develop viable solutions to the issues of the interagency addressed, six consistent themes have been identified.

1. No mechanism exists for planning or implementing interagency decisions at the operational level.

2. Directive authority for interagency operations has not been delegated to the operational level.

3. Unity of effort at the operational level is sporadic and not a surety.

4. Planning efforts outside the Department of Defense are inadequate, due to both insufficient interagency training and inadequate institutional support to interagency operations.

5. Interagency doctrine is underutilized and/or insufficient.

6. Non-coincident geographic divisions exist across the interagency system.

The following solutions are offered in answer to the developed themes.

1. The interagency makeup of Regional Command staffs (replacing or augmenting Combatant Commanders) must be adjusted to reflect the makeup of the National Security System.

2. Directive authority must be granted to the Regional Command staffs.

3. The necessity that a uniformed military officer hold the position of Regional Commander should be abolished.

4. The pol-mil template for Multilateral Complex Contingency Operations should be adopted into doctrine for the new staffs.

5. Interagency assignments must be made mandatory for promotion to Flag Rank/Senior Executive Service/Senior Foreign Service, etc.

6. Formal professional education must become a standard practice and a prerequisite for senior members of interagency staffs.

7. All geographic operating areas across departmental and agency lines should be aligned.

Taking the steps outlined above will look familiar to members of the military. In essence, the actions would recreate Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency process, divesting the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees of much of their authority and role in planning crisis response. It would create a vertical structure allowing interagency planning at both the strategic and operational levels of crisis management. Instead of the highest levels of government undertaking their policy formulation role in a vacuum, without deliberate input from an operationally and regionally focused staff, the reorganization would offer both the President and Principals Committee a variety of options they could choose from, adapt, or supplant.

The reformed Regional Commands could be structured in several ways. One construct would be to have interagency staffers augment the existing command structure, in the directorates of operations (I-3), intelligence (I-2), logistics (I-4), etc.

Augmentation would have minimal institutional impact but may not adequately reflect modern operational concerns. The current J/N/G staff structure is after all, a legacy system inherited from the First World War Army. A second concept would eradicate the current staff structure and organize the Regional Command staff along functional component lines, with a military component, intelligence component, diplomatic component, economic component, humanitarian assistance component, etc. In either case, the importance of adequate staffing is imperative. Without contributing agencies offering quality personnel in adequate numbers, the reorganized Regional Commands would remain stillborn.

It is here that the imperative for securing participation from all agencies becomes apparent. As in Goldwater-Nichols, some mechanism that forces the interagency to offer the appropriate personnel must be instituted. Requiring joint experience in order to be promoted to flag rank has proved effective in the military. It can be safely assumed the same requirement transposed to the interagency process would ensure adequate staffing for the Regional Commands. Similarly, requiring professional education to teach planning skills not currently resident within most parts of the executive branch is also imperative. Note the example of the US Navy, which was able to gain waivers from Goldwater-Nichols throughout the 1990's and promoted many officers to flag rank who had no experience in the joint world or professional joint education. It has only been with cancellation of the waivers that the Navy has made professional education and joint assignment a priority in officer development.

In the proposed construct, the Regional Command could be commanded by a skilled professional from any department or agency. So long as the Commander received

Senate confirmation and reflected the confidence of the President in planning and implementing US policy in the region — the origin of the Commander would be less important than the unity of command they would employ.

Creating a diverse interagency staff at the Regional Combatant Commands would leverage different agency skills in deliberate planning. Rather than the military instrument being predominant in operational and contingency plans (OPLANS and CONPLANS), real interagency input would go into development of interagency plans. Thus, adequate doctrine is necessary to formalize interagency operations. Neither the military's Annex V of the JOPES planning process nor Joint Pub 3-08: Joint Doctrine for Interagency Coordination are sufficient. The pol-mil template for Multilateral Complex Contingency Operations, however, is a valuable tool that could easily be implemented and made mandatory for use in interagency planning.

The restructuring would also, in effect, accomplish the stated purpose of the Hart-Rudman reforms. Power would shift closer to the regions, with important State representatives coordinating *and* directing regional policy from within their regions, rather than from Washington. The operational level of command would obviate the necessity of coordination across several State Department Bureaus. Instead, all aspects of diplomacy – whether counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, environmental policy, etc – would be directed at the regional level. In this construct, it is important that geographical regions be aligned across the interagency, in order to reduce redundancy and create an organized system of coordination.

There is a concern that creation of regionally focused diplomatic programs would emasculate Ambassadors and country-teams. Ambassadors are direct representatives of

the President, but it is the rare Ambassador that can ignore either the Secretary of State or Regional Combatant Commander in execution of their duties. Country teams are professional, dedicated, and run the tactical-operational level of interagency operations very effectively. Their bilateral efforts would be strengthened by a strong regional figure directing US policy, by granting the Ambassadors a new ability to speak of how general regional policy is to be directed. The excellent relationships that characterize most Combatant Commander-Country Team relationships would in turn be strengthened.

Institutional pushback in opposition to reform is the chief concern that is both most likely and most problematic. Departments and agencies have a vested interest in protecting their own "ricebowls" and corresponding influence. Thus it is important that reform be accomplished by legislation, rather then executive fiat, in order to legitimize the reforms and ensure permanence beyond a single Administration. Parallels to reform of the military and Defense Department are significant. After Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, the Services lost much of their power base to the Combatant Commands. In the interagency structure proposed, the departments and agencies of the government are much like the Services. Goldwater-Nichols has been a success in creating a joint service ethos, even if it has taken many years to develop. A similar interagency ethos will take time, possibly decades, to develop. Yet even with the joint ethos, the importance of the Services — the departments and agencies in the interagency context — has not been eliminated. Training, assignments, and broad policy implementation would still reside within the executive agencies, just as they do within the individual military Services.

It is recognized that implementation of the proposed reforms will be impossible to achieve without either a legislative "champion" or direct Presidential support. Given the

criticisms of the interagency process from all levels and the solutions recommended, such support is possible, even probable with the correct formulation of the proposal and adequate development of a viable structure.

Conclusions

The United States will remain heavily engaged in crisis mitigation, humanitarian assistance, counter-proliferation, and counter-terrorism operations for the foreseeable future. As such, the institutions that serve at the front lines of US efforts in the global community must adapt. The present construct of the Regional Combatant Commands and the ability of the interagency process to successfully meet the ever-changing security environment have proved inadequate throughout the past two decades. Where successful, results in the interagency process owe their success to the dedication and perseverance of talented individuals who have risen above the problems inherent to the system in order to construct viable work-arounds.

The JIACG concept at the Combatant Commands has shown limited success at coordination of counter-terrorism efforts, but it is susceptible to the same criticisms levied against the broader interagency process. The JIACGs lack directive authority, adequate resources, and unity of effort. They are a step in the right direction and the solutions offered by this paper would build upon ground laid through the JIACGs. But as a final response they are insufficient. Operational effectiveness of the interagency process is vital to successful prosecution not only in the war against terror, but in every security challenge confronting the United States. As such, it must be reconfigured to ensure an optimal response solidifying unity of effort across all agency boundaries.

NOTES

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[8] Cordesman, 10-14.

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